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NOTE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IM1UNIY: NEW LIFE?
A recent United States Supreme Court decision has breathed
new life into the waning and shrunken doctrine of intergovern-
mental tax immunity, at least with respect to federal immunity.
Finding no express constitutional basis but resting on the enuncia-
tions of AlcCulloch v. Maryland,1 the doctrine exempts from state
taxation the means and instrumentalities used by the federal gov-
ernment to maintain its proper functions. This immunity, after
reaching its broadest implications at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury and being reciprocally applied to many state activities during
that period, was virtually throttled by the 1940's. However, it has
now apparently been given fresh impetus by Kern-Limerick, Inc.
v. Scurlock."
The importance of this latest pronouncement, which granted
federal immunity from a state sales tax to contractors designated
as Government purchasing agents who were constructing a naval
ammunition depot for the United States under a cost-plus-fixed-
fee contract, must be viewed against the background of historic
intergovernmental tax immunity developments and projected
against the probable economic and political effects.
1. 4 Wheat. 316 (U.S. 1819).
2. 347 U. S. 110 (1954).
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Historic Development of the Immunity Doctrine
Following the McCulloch decision, which struck down a dis-
criminatory tax levied againsL the United States Bank, the Court
held unconstitutional further discriminatory tax legislation directed
against the bank,3 and ruled invalid a tax on bonds and notes and
other intangibles, including obligations of the United States, where
the ordinance exempted state obligations as well as stock in both
state banks and the United States Bank.4 Later non-discriminatory
taxes were also struck down as the growing immunity doctrine
rendered invalid a Pennsylvania tax applying to "all offices and
posts of profit" when levied against the captain of a federal cutter,5
as well as a New York tax on bank assets, when applied to capital
invested in United States securities."
From immunizing instrumentalities of the Federal Govern-
ment against state taxation, the Court proceeded to take steps to
guard states against economic encroachment by the Federal Gov-
ernment. In Collector v. Day,7 it ruled that the Federal Govern-
ment could not apply its income tax statute to the salary of a state
officer and later exempted interest paid on municipal bonds from
federal income levies.8
From a high tide of immunity for both federal and state activi-
ties and agencies, the Court L egan to retreat, or perhaps advance,
first by permitting New York to collect inheritance taxes on prop-
erty bequeathed to the United. States,9 and then by permitting the
Federal Government to apply a succession tax to property willed
to a local governinent. 10 The theory, which thus worked to narrow
the immunity, now grown far beyond the probable confines en-
visaged at the time of the McCulloch decision, was that this was
not a tax upon the property itself but a tax on the right to succeed
to the property-an exercise of sovereignty which affected the
property before it passed by the will."
But the immunity doctrine received its sharpest restriction
through application of the "proprietary function" test propounded
3. Osborn v. United States, 9 Wheat 738 (U.S. 1824).
4. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 448 (U.S. 1829).
5. Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (U.S. 1842).
6. Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 2 Black 620 (U.S. 1862).
7. 11 Wall. 113 (U.S. 1870).
8. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S.
601 (1895).
9. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625 (1896).
10. Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U. S. 249 (1903).
11. See id. at 254; United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 628-629
(1896) ; see also Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 (1900).
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in South Carolina v. United States,12 where a state liquor dispen-
sary system was held not to be exempt from federal taxation on the
ground that this was an example of a state carrying on a private
type business. However, tax immunity to state activities which
were governmental in character was reserved. The proprietary-
governmental dichotomy became further entrenched in 1934 when
it was again applied to a state liquor monopoly., 3 The Court there
rejected the interesting argument that South Carolina v. United
States was no longer controlling for since that decision the Eight-
eenth Amendment took traffic in liquor out of the category of legiti-
mate private business, and its repeal made a governmental function
of the liquor business, when conducted by a state.14 In the same
year it was decided that the federal income tax could properly be
assessed against the salaries of the members of the board of trustees
of a state-operated railroad 5 on the ground that operating such a
railroad was not a usual state governmental function.
The denial of immunity from federal taxation on the theory
that the particular state functions involved had the earmarks of
similar enterprises conducted for private gain was later extended
to admission charges to football games of a state university,'(
similar charges for use of a municipal beach,' 7 and then to a state
owned and operated business of bottling and selling mineral
waters.'1
While these last cases sustained a federal tax levied directly on
a state or municipal enterprise or activity, the Court has never
upheld a tax assessed directly on a federal enterprise by a state.' 9
However, the sweep of immunity of federal instrumentalities did
become limited to some extent. Withdrawn20 were exemptions of
income from copyrights and patents granted only four years pre-
12. 199 U. S. 437 (1905).
13. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934).
14. See id. at 369.
15. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934).
16. Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439 (1938).
17. Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U. S. 411 (1949).
18. New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946). The Court main-
tained that the proprietory test was outmoded, concluding that the real
test was whether or not a federal tax would result in undue interference with
a state's exercise of its power, and argued that Congress can assess revenue
from any source not uniquely capable of being earned only by a state, even if
the incidence falls on the state. See id. at 580-584.
19. See, e.g., Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441 (1943) ; see also
Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1886). However, Congress may by
statute permit direct taxation on a federal instrumentality, but the tax will
be invalid unless levied in conformity with the federal statute. Federal Land
Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95 (1941).
20. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932).
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viously,21 and enterprises strictly private in nature but operated
under license from the United States were deemed not to be gov-
ernmental instrumentalities and thus not entitled to the federal tax
immunity.22
A similar limiting of the scope of this immunity is pointed up
within other areas of specific revenue measures in the broad picture
of taxation and exemptions. Gillespie v. State of Oklahonma,23
exempting from state taxation a private individual's income arising
from oil produced on Indian land leased from the United States,
and Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co.,24 holding the federal
income tax inapplicable to income derived by a lessee from state
lands, were both expressly overruled by a decision which held that
the Federal Government could tax income of a private company
whose interest was derived through a lessee of state lands.25
As to taxation of the salaries of government employees, the
doctrine of Collector v. Day held sway for nearly 70 years, being
followed for the last time in a holding that the Federal Govern-
ment could not tax the income of a city water system official be-
cause providing water was an essential city function.2 6 Two years
later this area of immunity was erased when the Court sustained a
state income tax applied to the salary of an employee of a federal
agency 27 The final step was taken in 1939 when by statute the
federal income tax base was defined to include salaries of state
and local officers and employees, 2 8 the states being given the corre-
sponding right to levy taxes on salaries of federal officers and
employees.29
In the area of sales, use and excise taxes the tendency of the
court to restrict immunity was nearly as late in its development as
in the field of salaries. The Court ruled in a series of cases extend-
ing from 1928 to 193630 that sales or excise taxes could not be
collected if the burden fell directly on a government immunized
21. Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142 (1928).
22. Federal Compress Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17 (1934); Broad
River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178 (1933).
23. 257 U. S. 501 (1922).
24. 285 U. S. 393 (1932).
25. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938).
26. Brush v. CIR, 300 U. S. 352 (1937).
27. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939).
28. 53 Stat. 574 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 22(a) (1952). The statute was
upheld in a test case brought by a justice of the Illinois Supreme Court. Gunn
v. Dallman, 171 F. 2d 36 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U. S. 937 (1949).
29. 53 Stat. 575 (1939), 5 U. S. C. § 4a (1952).
30. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928) ; Graysburg Oil
Co. v. Texas, 278 U. S. 582 (1929) ; Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 570 (1931) ; Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393 (1936).
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from the taxing power of another even if such sales or excise taxes
were originally paid by a private interest.31
In Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knoxi 2 and Graves v. Texas Co." it
was ruled that the state excise and privilege taxes upon the dealers
involved were unconstitutional because the sales were directly to
the Federal Government 34 and the Court chose to equate this type
of tax with the imposition of an economic burden.3 5 This test of
an economic burden, "real and not imaginary,"3 6 when applied in
other tax areas had resulted in the upholding of a tax on the sale
of municipal bonds 37 and income taxes imposed upon government
officials.38 But upon a finding of a burden, at least two types of in-
direct taxes had also been declared unconstitutional.3 9
In 1937, in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,40 a gross receipts
tax on an independent contractor working for the United States
was upheld on the ground that the contractor was not a govern-
ment instrumentality, and the suggestion was made that, in any
event, the economic burden might not have fallen on the United
States.4' By 1941, the ultimate impact of the economic burden was
not considered paramount, for in Alabanw v. King & Boozer 42
the Court overruled Graves v. Texas Co.0 4 3 and upheld a sales tax
on materials purchased by a contractor working for the United
States on a cost-plus contract. In a companion case, the Court
evolved the theory of legal incidence, namely that a tax whose inci-
dence falls on a private contractor may not be deemed constitu-
tionally bad as a tax directly on the Federal Government even
31. See Justice Stone's dissent in Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 570, 580-583 (1931) in which he suggests that realistic economics
compel the conclusion that conditions of the market may force the burden
to remain with the seller or even shift back to the producer, rather than to
the buyer or consumer.
32. 277 U. S. 218 (1928).
33. 298 U. S. 393 (1936).
34. However, in Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Groshean, 291 U. S.
466 (1934), the Court upheld an excise tax on gasoline sold to a Government
contractor.
35. See supra note 31.
36. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 234 (1937).
37. Willcuts v. Bunn, supra note 36.
38. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 466 (1939) ; Helvering v.
Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938).
39. Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 (1931) (a
manufacturer s excise tax on a motorcycle sold to a municipality held in-
valid) ; Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928) (a gasoline excise
tax collected from the seller held invalid as to sales made to the United
States).
40. 302 U. S. 134 (1937).
41. Id. at 159.
42. 314 U. S. (1941).
43. 298 U. S. 393 (1936).
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though the economic burden of the tax falls on the United States.41
However, Alabama v. King & Boozer may be distinguished
from Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox and Graves v. Texas Co. in that
in the former case the sales were to independent contractors, while
in the latter cases the sales were directly to governmental instru-
mntalities. But in another recent decision,1 a tax on the storing of
government-owned gasoline under a contract by which the United
States assumed liability for all state taxes was held valid as attach-
ing not to the worth of the government property but to the
privilege of storing the gasoline."0
Apart from the problem of whether or not an implied immunity
attaches in any particular instance, Congress has the power to
grant specific immunity from state taxation to any federal agency
or activity.47 Further, where Congress has remained silent and
has not declared affirmatively that an instrumentality carrying out
governmental action will not be subject to state or local taxation,
the inherent immunity continues.
48
The Court recently affirmed recognition of the immunity-
granting power in Congress by holding invalid a sales and use tax
applied to Government contractors working on Atomic Energy
Commission projects 49 because the statute exempting "activities"
of the Commission 0 was deemed sufficiently broad to embrace
these types of contracts. However, this section has since been
amended to remove specifically this exemption.51
Thus Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, the latest pronounce-
ment in the area of governmental tax immunity looms as important,
particularly in the area of sales levies, because it may indicate a
reversal in the general trend, judicial and statutory, to restrict
immunity. The case was distinguished from Alabama v. King &
Boozer on grounds that by reason of the Kern-Limerick contract
44. See Curry v. United States, 314 U. S. 14, 18 (1941). The Court
said that if the economic burden fell on the United States, it was there be-
cause the Federal Government accepted it by the terms of the contract.
45. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans, 345 U. S. 495 (1953).
46. The Court distinguished United States v. County of Allegheny, 322
U. S. 174 (1944), where a property tax as applied to government-owned
machinery leased to the taxpayer was held invalid on the ground that the
property was the measure of the tax.
47. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21 (1939);
Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374 (1923) ; Smith v. Kansas City
Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921).
48. See Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441 (1943).
49. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U. S. 232 (1952), followed inr
General Electric Co. v. State, 347 U. S. 909 (1954), reversing 42 Wash. 2d
411, 256 P. 2d 265 (1953).
50. 60 Stat. 765 (1946), 42 U. S. C. § 1809(b) (1952).
51. 67 Stat. 575, 42 U. S. C. A. § 1809(b) (Supp. 1953).
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the contractor acted only as a purchasing agent, and title was to
vest in the United States directly from the vendor of the materials,
thus making the Government the disclosed purchaser, -5 2 while in
the King & Boozer contract, title was to vest in the Federal Gov-
ernment only after delivery of the materials and inspection.53 Thus
while the United States bore the economic burden of the state tax
in each case, the incidence of the tax in King & Boozer fell on the
contractor and not on the United States.5 4
Political and Economic Results
Yet the fundamental problems of intergovernmental tax im-
munity, and the concern now is primarily with the immunity
granted the Federal Government, may not be so much legal as
economic and political. Any sound tax policy involves more than
the hell-or-high-water attainment of particular revenue goals; it
requires a careful consideration of all the effects of a particular
tax, including its likely repercussions on consumption, investment,
production, employment and income.55
The immunities from state and municipal property and sales
taxes are producing, and may further generate, significant economic
effects on state and municipal economies. In 22 states, federal
exemption from state property taxation is embodied in constitu-
tional or statutory provisions. Thus these states could not tax
federal property without constitutional or statutory revisions even
if Congress consents to such taxation.50 In the other 26 states,
constitutions and statutes either are silent or specifically provide
for taxing federal property when Congress consents. Of these latter
states, 17 have taken the necessary action to permit taxation by
repealing constitutional and statutory prohibitions between 1945
and 1950Y.
The amount of revenue thus denied to states5s and municipalities
is at least partially suggested when it is realized that the United
States owns one-fourth of the total land area of the 48 states and
52. See Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U. S. 110, 119-121 (1954).
53. See id. at 118, 119.
54. See id. at 112.
55. See Buckler, The Theory of Business Taxation in Taxation and
Business Concentration 249-252 (1952) ; Anderson, Taxation and the Ameri-
can Economy 3, 4 (1951).
57. See note 47 supra and text thereto.
57. Federation of Tax Administrators, Research Rep. No. 28 (Jan.
1950). Maryland has now repealed the federal agencies' exemption in its
sales tax statute. Laws Md. 1954, c. 31.
58. States, in particular, continue to face the problem of spending
in excess of income. 18 Tax Administrators News 49, 50 (May, 1954).
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the District of Columbia.59 A 1953 report of the New York City
Tax Commission points out that the value of property in that city
which was exempt from taxation rose from $4.5 billions in 1935 to
$7 billions in 1953, an increase of 53 per cent, while the value of
taxable real estate increased only about 20 per cent, from $16.6
billions to almost $20 billio:as. Of the property thus beyond tax
range, the federal exemption accounted for $351.6 millions in
1953, an increase of 78 per cent from the 1935 figure of $197.6
millions.60
Defense industry has brought a new complication to the prob-
lem of federal immunity from state and local taxes, particularly
property taxes, and was the subject of a complaint from the General
Appraisal Committee of the National Association of Assessing
Officers, who reported that reduction of the state or municipal tax
base may more than offset any benefits from the presence of a de-
fense industry.6' Charging that the provisions of many defense
industry contracts are withdrawing from local governments sources
of revenue they desperately need, the group objected to the terms
of some of those contracts whereby upon first payment by the
Federal Government for equipment, title to both the machinery
and raw material passes to the United States, adding to the exempt
category. The committee proposed that Congress be asked to author-
ize both full state and local property taxation and recommended
an end to the Defense Department practice of taking title to fac-
tories and warehouses, thus exempting them from local property
taxes.
632
The effect of the Kern-Limerick decision on sales tax collec-
tions must be viewed against the recital that in 1953, sales and
gross receipts taxes accounted for the biggest share of state revenue
-more than $6 billion of the $10.5 billion total tax take.63 In
1951, when 28 states were imposing a sales tax, revenues accounted
for $2 billions; furthermore, three additional states began to im-
pose sales taxes in 1952.64 The importance of sales taxes is further
emphasized by a study which found that during the period of
1941 to 1947, sales taxes moved from second to first in revenue
59. Guandolo, Federal Payments to States and Local Governenzcts
Respecting Property of the Unite-d States, 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 509 (1953).
60. 89 America 95 (April 25, 1953).
61. 67 American City 109 (May, 1952).
62. Ibid.
63. Business Week, Sept. 26, 1953, p. 134. For an account of 1953 state
sales tax revisions see Tax Policy, Nov.-Dec., 1953, pp. 33-36.
64. Federation of Tax Administrators, Research Rep. No. 33, Trends
in State Finance 12 (1951).
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importance, while property taxes, although continuing to account
for a large share, dropped from third to sixth.65
The sales tax is also of growing importance to municipalities,
for while once they were virtually wholly financed by ad valorem
taxes, the cities have now moved into the area of sales, wage and
income taxes following state and federal leads in broadening their
tax base. 6 In 1908, the larger cities received more than one-third
billion dollars, or 82 per cent of total revenue, from property taxes.
In 1954, the general property tax yielded $2.5 billions, but this
was only 39 per cent of the total receipts.67
A concrete example of the effect of this loss of revenue, on a
restricted scale, was presented by Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co.66
Within four months after the Court upheld the federal statutory
exemption for Atomic Energy Commission contractors, the State
of Tennessee had received claims for tax refunds from such con-
tractors amounting to nearly $3 millions.6 9 An estimate by the
AEC itself on December 26, 1951, prior to the Roane-Anderson
decision, put the sales and use taxes and business and occupation
taxes then in controversy in the various states with AEC installa-
tions at $5.5 millions and estimated the annual accrual rate of dis-
puted tax assessments at over $5 millions.7 0 Governor Langlie of
Washington has estimated the refund required of his state under
the AEC contractors' immunity at $1.2 millions and said it would
be multiplied many times if the exemption were to be extended to
sub-contractors. Langlie also pointed out that the Roane-Anderson
decision threatened the state's right to collect various payroll taxes
which furnished security benefits to those employed on AEC
projects in that state."2
The loss of a large part of the sales tax revenue to the states
through the Kern-Limerick decision, should it prove to be a
"Pandora's box," could be a serious blow to local financial struc-
tures, particularly in those areas which have heavy concentrations
65. The Tax Foundation, Recent Trends in Major State Taxes 1941-
1947, 7, 8 (1948). The study also indicates that property taxes are the least
affected by economic conditions and sales taxes are less sensitive than indi-
vidual or corporate income levies.
66. Mississippi is the latest to extend to its municipalities the right to
impose a sales tax. 18 Tax Administrators News 41 (April, 1954).
67. Moak, State and Local Taxes, 27 Current History 97, 101 (Aug.,
1954).
68. 342 U. S. 232 (1952).
69. Hearings before the Joint Committe on Atomic Energy, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1952).
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id. at 22.
72. Ibid.
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of Government construction, since defense spending still requires
13 per cent of the nation's goods and services, compared to 41 per
cent in 1944, and 14 per cent in 1952, mid-periods in World War
II and the Korean conflict. 3 The budget for 1955 calls for a total
of $37.5 billions in military spending, including $1.1 billions for
new military construction arid $1.6 billions for construction al-
ready begun.7 4 While no present breakdown is available to show
the concentration of spending, 1951 figures reveal that seven states
then received half of the $8.3 billions spent for plant construction
while the South got a major portion of the $4.2 billions in military
post and camp construction fc.r that year.75
The Treasury Department has recognized this threat to state
and local revenues and in a 1942 letter opposing a bill to exempt
from state and local taxation. the sale, purchase, storage, use or
consumption of personalty used to fulfill defense contracts, told
the House Ways and Means Committee:
"... If Congress were to exempt defense contractors from this
type of state taxation it would seriously interfere with the
revenue-raising ability of taxing authorities which depend on
such taxes for substantial revenues. For as our national economy
is converted from a peacetime to a war economy, an ever-
increasing proportion of goods and supplies will be sold for
the ultimate use of the government, thereby reducing the volume
of business activity intended to be tapped by such state transac-
tion taxes. All transactions of purchase, particularly those
through a contractor, represent economic activity carried on
in some state and local environment. They all require the usual
amount of state and local government services.1
7 6
A projection of the possible effect of such immunity for defense
contractors may be gained by reference to a Tennessee estimate
that if the exemption from sales taxes granted AEC contractors
had, in 1952, been given to all armed forces contractors, it would
have cost that state $2 millions yearly in sales and use taxes-the
equivalent of 10 per cent of the total sales tax collections and two
per cent of total revenues. 77
The political considerations involved in such immunity are
pointed up in an exchange of correspondence on the proposal, later
approved,7 to end the immunity for AEC contractors. Lewis L.
Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, claimed
73. U. S. News & World Report, July 9, 1954, pp. 62-65.
74. Business Week, Feb. 27, 1953, pp. 28, 29.
75. U. S. News & World Report, Aug. 17, 1951, p. 24.
76. Hearings, supra note 70, at 23, 24.
77. Id. at 32.
78. See note 51 supra.
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the AEC activities brought new operations to areas of economic
drought,'7 in arguing for continued special immunity for such
AEC contractors. But he conceded that under some circumstances
this tax immunity does or could reduce states' revenues without
reducing their burdens and recognized that justification for ending
such immunity might be found in "overriding considerations of
Federal-State-local fiscal policy."80
The attitude of the present administration is set out in a com-
panion letter, also addressed to the Joint Congressional Committee
on Atomic Energy, from Rowland Hughes, Assistant Director of
the Bureau of the Budget, in which he says, after recognizing that
AEC's stand favoring retention of the statutory tax immunity had
some economic validity:
"At the same time, the Bureau of the Budget is of the
opinion that considerations of Federal-State-local fiscal policy
should be decisive in matters of this kind. Our review of budget
estimates and legislative proposals has made us acutely aware
that the exemption from State and local taxes which is afforded
most Federal property and operations and to some contractors
for the Federal government, has been used, often successfully,
in support of other substantial claims for Federal payments.
This bureau has endeavored to contribute to policies and prac-
tices which would lessen the impact of the Federal tax exemp-
tion upon the State and local governments, so that the needs
for special types of financial assistance to them would be held
to a minimum and the financial independence of these govern-
ments would be strengthened." 8'
This policy statement followed resolutions adopted by the 44th
Annual Governor's Conference (1952) and by the National Asso-
ciation of Tax Administrators (1953) requesting revision of the
AEC statute to eliminate such tax immunity. 2
Conclusion
The solution to the restricted tax immunity problem raised by
the Kern-Limerick case is predictable: it will undoubtedly be re-
solved either by express congressional action making such con-
tractors liable for state and municipal taxation, or the terms of the
Government contracts-provisions which heretofore have given
the United States title directly from the vendor and have made
the contractors purchasing agents for the Government 83-- will be
79. Sen. Rep. No. 694, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1953).
80. Id. at 6.
81. Id. at 6, 7.
82. Id. at 3, 4.
83. See notes 52-54 supra and text thereto.
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changed to bring them within the assessment area, providing there
is sufficient economic and political pressure for such taxation.
But the basic solution to the troublesome immunities problem,
which arises in part from the fact that the state and Federal Gov-
ernment are overlapping one another in their quest for revenue,
is grounded in understanding the fundamental concepts underlying
proper division of the burden of taxation together with an adapta-
tion of the taxing system to fit the varying needs of the different
units of government.8 4
Studies of intergovernmental taxing problems are already under-
way and others are scheduled by both the states and the Federal
Government. 5 They are surely long overdue because our economy,
already hard pressed by the burden of federal taxes, must satisfy
further state and local needs from a total revenue take which al-
ready exceeds 25 per cent of! the national income, said to be the
danger point in taxation. 6 At least one solution to partially ease
the squeeze on the states may lie in state imposition of an excise
tax based upon the net income of the proprietary activities, as well
as an ad valorem tax on the real property of any federal, state or
local agency. Other devices for sound revenue distribution, oft-
used and oft-suggested for more extensive implementation, are
subvention and tax sharing. 8 Federal tax grants were estimated
in 1952 at $2.7 billions or about 12 per cent of total state and local
revenues.8 9 In 1950, grants to the states alone accounted for $2
billions, which was 17 per cent of the total state revenues 0
It may be that a federal sales tax, shared with the states and im-
posed at a rate sufficient to pe rmit abolition of state and municipal
sales taxes, or at least sufficient to maintain local revenues if fed-
eral immunity is expanded, offers a possible solution. But such a
legislative policy would be open to the criticism leveled at the
present state and local sales tax programs: that they are regres-
84. See U. S. Treasury Dep't, Federal-State-Local Tax Coordination 3(1952).
85. 17 Tax Administrators News 88, 89 (Aug., 1953).
86. ArnoldState and Local Taxing Capacity in The Limits of Taxable
Capacity 110-112 (1953).
87. See Sen. Doe. No. 86, 751h Cong., 1st Sess. V-VIII (1937).
88. See generally, Blough, The Relative Place of Subventions and
Tax Sharing in Tax Relations Among Government Units 83 (1938).
89. U. S. Treasury Dep't, Federal-State-Local Tax Coordination 5
(1952).
90. The device of tax sharing which is widely used on the state-local
level has been stalled on the federal-state level primarily because the states
are unwilling to surrender further revenue sources and taxing power to the
Federal Government, although probable complication in sharing of intra-
state revenues is often assigned as another reason. Id. at 6.
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sive measures, cutting into consumer spending to a greater extent
than income taxes raising the same amount of revenue,' Because
of the susceptibility of taxes to being shifted, a claim perhaps most
often applied to sales taxes, it is demonstratively possible for the
contractor to shift the burden to the United States and thus to the
taxpayers of the nation as a whole, making them bear a particular
state's sales tax. As noted previously, this may not always be the
case. 2 But sales taxes are also charged with resembling trade bar-
riers, changing patterns of consumption and causing alterations in
the total amounts of expenditures in the economy, 93 although of-
course a federal sales tax would not be open to the trade barrier
accusation.
Perhaps the most detailed proposal to resolve property tax ex-
emptions was embodied in a bill which died in committee in the
82d Congress. 4 It would, in brief, permit taxation of Federal Gov-
ernment property acquired after specified cut-off dates. Included are
provisions for tax equivalent payments and transition payments for
property exempt under the bill; consent to taxation of property
held pending disposition after being acquired in connection with
loans or contracts of insurance or guaranty; and provisions per-
mitting taxation of property leased or sold under conditional sales
contracts to private persons. TMajor exemptions would apply to
federal office buildings, penal and welfare institutions and similar
instrumentalities. This plan represents a compromise between
those who would favor complete abolition of federal tax immunity
and those who feel such immunity desirable and necessary. Even
this proposal, however, would solve only those conflicts of eco-
nomic and political interest in the area of property taxation, leaving
untouched the area of sales and use taxation where perhaps the
effect, at least as to revenue, is more painful to state and local
governments.
These solutions all lie in the area of legislation. Perhaps what
is needed is a complete evaluation of the entire problem of taxa-
tion, its overlappings and its immunities, with a resulting overall
program worked out by the states and the Federal Government.
But until such legislation can be drafted, and a difficult task it will
91. See, e.g., Kimmel, Taxes and Economic Incentives 150, 151 (1950).
92. Id. at 131-134; Anderson, Taxation and the American Economy
72-79 (1951).
93. Jacoby, Sales and Use Taxes as Barriers to Trade-Interstate and
lntrastate in Tax Barriers to Trade 189, 190 (1941).
94. See Guandolo, Federal Payments to States and Local Governments
Respecting Property of the United States, 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 509, 511-513
(1953).
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surely be, it would appear sound policy for the courts to continue
to restrict federal tax immunity, as has apparently been the
waveringly-consistent policy until the Kern-Limerick case.
As Judge Clark has argued: "The immunity of the sovereign
from taxation would seem to belong to the legal philosophy of the
Middle Ages... and be as unsuited to modem conditions as the
immunity from suit.... ."5 Perhaps this is stronger language than
the problem requires, and furthermore it appears impossible to
destroy completely a doctrine so deeply rooted. Yet the economic
conditions of today appear to justify its judicial and legislative
restriction, if not its abolition.
95. United States v. Hoboken, 29 F. 2d 932, 940 (D. N.J. 1928).
